Veeneman Abstract

The Potential for Dialogue between Theology and Natural Science in the Thought of Karl Rahner

Although dialogue between theology and science is not one of the areas for which he is most remembered, the discussion of Karl Rahner on the relationship between theology and science in the Theological Investigations deserves attention. In “Natural Science and Reasonable Faith,” Rahner argues that theology and science are distinct in method and in what they seek to explain and thus cannot be seen to contradict in principle. Secondary conflicts between theology and natural science frequently occur because one discipline has transgressed its own boundaries and has moved into the area of the other discipline.

Rahner argues that an examination of the fundamental relationship between theology and the natural sciences will lead one to the conclusion that theology and natural science cannot in principle contradict one another since each is distinct from the other in both methodology and in that which they investigate. Natural science investigates particular things that human beings encounter in the world and the various relationships between these things. This kind of investigation is one that examines a posteriori experiences that human beings have gained through the use of their senses. Theology, on the other hand, considers the whole of reality. Its method is an a priori questioning. Because of this, Rahner argues, there should be no fear of conflict between theology and the natural sciences as long as each discipline acts in a manner consistent with its nature.

Because natural science proceeds from particular objects, the original unity (which can be seen in theology) cannot be found within its work. As a result, Rahner argues that natural science can and ideally should be methodologically atheistic. There is no need to presume within investigations into natural science that the consideration of one particular event or occurrence should automatically bring God into the discussion. One event or occurrence should always be explained by means of a further event or occurrence within the whole rather than the consideration of the original whole. God cannot be classified as an individual factor in a series of considered phenomena.

At first glance, this argument may sound like one that seeks to turn to theology only when the natural sciences have failed to provide an answer. In such a scheme, God is a convenient explanation for things that cannot be otherwise explained, but not an initial or primary consideration. This is not the case in Rahner’s thought. For Rahner, the task of metaphysics and theology is to consider the whole in itself. Theology is not something that comes in when those working in the natural sciences have exhausted all avenues of investigation. Rather, theology and metaphysics should precede the natural sciences in the logical order of consideration. Theology and metaphysics occur, “when the knowing subject, instead of focusing its attention on this or that particular object of the a posteriori experience, asks itself, in a total return to itself, about the conditions of the possibility of the subject and of a knowledge and a freedom which have a reflexive knowledge of themselves.”¹¹ Ibid, 22. For Rahner, the subject can only know about God by going out into the world and gaining sensate knowledge. The subject then comes back to itself and knows itself and God through the experiences had in the world.

Although he has argued that theology and natural science should ideally have no conflicts, due to the differences in their essential natures, Rahner also recognizes that secondary conflicts between theology and natural science are likely to occur. Such conflicts have occurred several times since the Enlightenment, but these conflicts can be solved as they have been several times in the past. If a complete resolution is not possible, Rahner holds that at least a truce is, coming about once one sees that the affirmations of the two sides cannot be shown to be entirely contradictory.

These secondary conflicts occur when one side transgresses its own boundaries and finds itself in the realm of the other discipline. Such transgressions are usually not noticed right away and come only to light when the other discipline protests. Without dialogue, it would be more difficult for the dialogue partners to be aware of times when they may be crossing boundaries.

Apart from dialogue between the two disciplines this boundary crossing will continue to be problematic for theology and for the natural sciences. Rahner suggests that there are many topics on which theology and natural science must engage in dialogue. These include ideas of spirit and matter, temporality, evolution, and divine causality. While one might not agree with all of the suggestions Rahner makes regarding exactly how to approach this dialogue, his argument that theology and natural science work in different spheres and must dialogue from those spheres offers a fruitful direction in which to discuss the relationship between theology and science. By rendering theology and science non- competitors, Rahner has diffused some of the potential intensity of the dialogue and has created a space for the two disciplines to better articulate the ways in which each can move forward in cooperation with the other.